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Abstract: Previous research shows that individuals make systematic errors when judging
exponential growth, which has harmful effects for their financial well-being. This study analyzes
in how far individuals are aware of their errors and how these errors are shaped by arithmetic and
conceptual problems. While arithmetic problems could be overcome by employing computational
assistance like a pocket calculator, this is not the case for conceptual problems, a term we use to
subsume other error drivers like a general misunderstanding of exponential growth or
overwhelming task complexity. In an incentivized experiment, we find that participants strongly
overestimate the accuracy of their intuitive judgment. At the same time, their willingness to pay
for arithmetic assistance is too high on average, often much above the actual benefits a calculator
provides. Using a multi-tier system of task complexity we can show that the willingness to pay for
arithmetic assistance is hardly related to its benefits, indicating that participants do not really
understand how the interplay of arithmetic and conceptual problems shape their errors in
exponential growth tasks. Our findings are relevant for policy making and financial advisory
practice and can help to design effective approaches to mitigate the detrimental effects of
misperceived exponential growth.
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Introduction

Exponential growth bias (EGB) refers to the systematic tendency to linearize exponential growth
when assessing it intuitively (e.g., Wagenaar and Sagaria 1975, Jones 1979, Wagenaar and
Timmers 1979). This has detrimental effects for financial decision making and well-being: Morebiased individuals borrow more, save less, and favor shorter maturities (Stango and Zinman 2009).
Various types of remedies have been suggested to mitigate the effects of EGB, such as teaching
fundamental concepts and formulas, providing task-specific assistance by showing sample
outcomes, and promoting the use of calculating devices.1
An important question for the design of just-in-time support (offering task-specific assistance right
before individuals make a financial decision; Fernandes et al. 2014) is whether individuals believe
that they can benefit from the offered assistance, i.e., whether they are aware of their errors when
judging exponential growth. Research on overconfidence suggests that individuals overestimate
the quality of their intuitive judgment (Glaser and Weber 2010, Levy and Tasoff 2017). As a
consequence, optional support might not be utilized and more paternalistic interventions like a
salient display of the long-term decision consequences could be advisable. On the other hand, if
individuals understand how error-prone their judgment is and how much they can benefit from the
offered assistance, less obtrusive interventions might be sufficient.
The study at hand has two related goals: Firstly, we explore whether individuals can properly
assess the accuracy of their intuitive judgment in exponential growth-related decision problems.
Secondly, we investigate whether they are well calibrated in their judgment of the benefits that a
support tool will provide. We focus on a very simple type of support, a pocket calculator.
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Following previous research on the value of a pocket calculator in exponential estimation tasks
(e.g., Foltice and Langer 2017) we confront our participants with the same set of questions twice,
once without any means of aid (Stage 1) and once equipped with a pocket calculator (Stage 2).
The first set of answers allows to assess the overall error size, while the second set of answers
helps to disentangle the extent to which the overall errors are driven by arithmetic and conceptual
problems. The arithmetic component of the problems could be overcome by employing a pocket
calculator, it thus merely reflects the inability to conduct the proper calculations in one’s head. The
remaining error is due to conceptual problems, a term we use to subsume all other error drivers,
like a general misunderstanding of exponential growth or overwhelming task complexity, which
increases the susceptibility for errors.
We conduct an incentivized experiment to answer our research questions. In Stage 1 of the
experiment, participants provide their best estimate to 14 exponential growth-based household
finance questions. Here, participants have to rely on their intuitive judgment, and both arithmetic
and conceptual problems may induce errors in their answers. To assess the awareness of possible
errors, we elicit the confidence that the given answer falls within a ±10% interval around the
correct answer after each question. To assess the understanding of how the errors are shaped by
arithmetic and conceptual problems, we also elicit the willingness to pay (WTP) for a pocket
calculator after each question. Questions differ by their level of complexity. Our financially literate
student participants should hardly have any conceptual problems when facing the simplest
questions (with the calculator being of great value here), but can be expected to struggle when
facing the most complicated questions (with the calculator being of little value here). The incentive
structure is set up in a way that the WTP should reflect the anticipated benefit of calculator use.
By relating the WTP to the actual benefits of the calculator (derived from a comparison of answers
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in the two stages), we can disentangle whether participants attribute their anticipated errors mainly
to arithmetic problems or to conceptual problems.
We find strong overconfidence in the ability to judge exponential growth accurately, indicating
that participants do not fully recognize the magnitude of their errors. At the same time, their WTP
for the calculator is too high on average, in some cases much above the benefits the calculator
provides. Overall, our participants seem to have just a vague understanding of how their errors are
shaped by arithmetic and conceptual problems. The relation between the WTP for and the benefits
of calculator use is positive but very weak. The strongest (negative) predictor of WTP is the
confidence of our participants in the quality of their judgment in Stage 1. That is, they are
particularly interested in employing calculator support when they perceive the task to be difficult,
but fail to factor in that the calculator might be often of little help due to conceptual problems.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 derives our research hypotheses.
Section 3 describes the experimental design. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes by
summarizing the findings and discussing policy implications.

2

Framework and Expectations

Given the high monetary stakes involved in many exponential growth-related decisions and the
general availability of support tools, it is puzzling that EGB has been found to be related to various
types of subpar financial behavior (Stango and Zinman 2009). A plausible explanation is that
individuals are unaware of the magnitude of their errors in the intuitive judgment of exponential
growth and thus do not utilize the support.
To provide some formal framework for the following analysis, we define:
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(1)

to be the error percentage of an estimate, where 𝑥 ∗ is the correct answer of a given exponential
estimation task and 𝑥 is the individual’s estimate provided without calculator support. More
important for our research questions is the absolute error percentage:
|𝑥 − 𝑥 ∗ |
𝐴𝐸𝑃 =
𝑥∗

(2)

̂ of the magnitude of this quantity.2 Building on overconfidence
and our subjects’ estimate 𝐴𝐸𝑃
research showing that individuals overestimate the quality of their intuitive judgment (Glaser and
Weber 2010, Levy and Tasoff 2017) we expect that participants are overconfident in the accuracy
̂ < 𝐴𝐸𝑃.
of their intuitive judgment of exponential growth, i.e. 𝐴𝐸𝑃
For a profound discussion of proper decision support it is important to understand the individuals’
introspection into the main drivers of their errors, arithmetic and conceptual problems. To this end,
we define:

𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑐 =

|𝑥𝑐 − 𝑥 ∗ |
𝑥∗

(3)

to be the absolute error percentage in estimations with a calculator available, i.e., 𝑥𝑐 denotes our
participants’ answers in Stage 2 of the experiment. With the purely arithmetic problems resolved
by the calculator, 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑐 can be interpreted as the component of the absolute error percentage that
is due to conceptual problems. Finally, we define:
𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑎 = 𝐴𝐸𝑃 − 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑐

(4)
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to be the component of the absolute error percentage that is due to arithmetic problems. While it
seems natural to assume that 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑎 has to be non-negative, this is not necessarily the case. Foltice
and Langer (2017) show that the availability of a calculator can also increase errors in specific
exponential tasks when individuals overly rely on (flawed) formulas and neglect common sense.
̂𝑎 for our research questions however, our participants’ beliefs about the
We are interested in 𝐴𝐸𝑃
̂𝑎 should not become negative as this would imply that participants
magnitude of their 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑎 . 𝐴𝐸𝑃
know that the calculator deteriorates their judgment quality, and we therefore do not believe that
̂𝑎 affect our analyses to a relevant extent.
negative values of 𝐴𝐸𝑃
̂𝑎 , we elicit the WTP for a pocket calculator, more precisely the WTP for receiving
To measure 𝐴𝐸𝑃
a remuneration for the Stage 2 answer (with calculator) instead of the respective answer in Stage
1 (without calculator). As the remuneration is a linear function of 𝐴𝐸𝑃 (Stage 1) and 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑐 (Stage
2) in the relevant range of answers (for details see Subsection 3.2), the remuneration improvement
is linear in 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑎 . The WTP for calculator use should correspond to the anticipated remuneration
̂𝑎 .
improvement and is thus linearly related to the anticipated error improvement 𝐴𝐸𝑃
As we are not aware of any research that has previously explored individuals’ awareness of
arithmetic and conceptual problems (and their interaction) in EGB-related tasks, our analyses and
̂𝑎 are rather explorative and based on intuition than derived from
expectations related to 𝐴𝐸𝑃
existing research or sound theory. Following our earlier prediction that our participants will
̂ < 𝐴𝐸𝑃), it seems most natural to predict that 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑎
underestimate the magnitude of 𝐴𝐸𝑃 (i.e., 𝐴𝐸𝑃
̂𝑎 < 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑎 ). This is because we are not aware of research showing a
is also underestimated (𝐴𝐸𝑃
systematic bias in judging the relative contribution of 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑐 and 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑎 to 𝐴𝐸𝑃. Alternatively, one
could have argued that participants are also overconfident in judging their ability to utilize the

Cordes, Foltice, Langer (2019): Misperception of Exponential Growth: Are People Aware of their Errors?

6

calculator, possibly even offsetting the underestimation of the Stage 1 error – but such a prediction
would be at least as ad hoc as the one we chose.
We are further interested in the question of whether individuals have some understanding of how
the arithmetic component of the error 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑎 and thus the value of the calculator varies with task
complexity. To induce within-subject variation in the extent to which the calculator provides
assistance, we ask questions in four levels of difficulty. We chose a sample of financially literate
business students who should all have the conceptual knowledge to answer our simplest questions
correctly when having access to a calculator, but who can be expected to struggle with the most
complicated questions. Thus, the calculator should provide great benefits in the easy and familiar
questions, but almost no benefits in the difficult and unfamiliar questions. Over all tasks and tiers
̂𝑎 and 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑎 . Translating the predictions about
we expect to observe a positive relation between 𝐴𝐸𝑃
̂𝑎 and 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑎 to testable hypotheses about the WTP for calculator use and its benefits, we predict
𝐴𝐸𝑃
that the WTP for the calculator is lower than the benefits it provides, yet that the WTP is at least
positively related to the benefits it provides.

3

Experimental Design

3.1

General Setup

The experiment is fully computer-based, except for a short introduction that is handed out and read
aloud by the experimenter prior to the start of the experiment (see Appendix A). Pen and paper are
provided for notes and calculations; cell phones, calculators, etc. are prohibited.
The main experiment consists of four parts (Figure 1). First, comprehensive instructions explain
the experimental task, the incentive structure, and the software interface (Appendix B contains the
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full instructions). We carefully check for understanding: Participants can only continue if they
answer a set of check-up questions correctly.

Instructions
Stage 1
(no calculator)

Explanation of experimental tasks, incentive structure, and the software interface.
Estimation task: 14 exponential growth questions.
Confidence task: Probability that 𝐴𝐸𝑃 < 10%.
WTP task: Willingness to pay for a calculator.

Stage 2
(with calculator)

Estimation task: Same 14 exponential growth questions.
Confidence task: Probability that 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑐 < 10%.

Questionnaire

Demographics, personal financial situation, and standardized individual differences scales.

Figure 1: Course of the experiment.

In Stage 1, participants estimate the answers to 14 exponential growth-related household finance
questions (“estimation task”; Appendix C contains the question texts). The sequence is randomized
and different for each participants to control for ordering effects. To assess the perceived accuracy
of answers, participants have to estimate the probability that their answer is within a ±10% interval
around the correct answer directly after each question, i.e., 𝐴𝐸𝑃 < 10% (“confidence task”).
Further, participants have to state their WTP for a pocket calculator directly after each question
(“WTP task”). The WTP is used to determine whether participants are paid according to their
answer without calculator (Stage 1) or with calculator (Stage 2).
Participants are instructed to raise their hand after having completed Stage 1. Then, they receive a
standard pocket calculator. To avoid operational issues, we explain the handling of the calculator
prior to the start of the experiment and assist upon request during the experiment.
In Stage 2, participants answer the same 14 exponential growth questions as in Stage 1, but now
with the help of the calculator. The ordering is again randomized, but different than in Stage 1. To
assess the awareness of conceptual problems, participants have to estimate the probability that
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their answer falls within a ±10% interval around the correct answer directly after each question
(i.e., 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑐 < 10%).
The exponential growth questions differ by their level of complexity (“Tiers”). Tier 1 questions
cover fundamental issues involving exponential growth (e.g., estimating the future value of an
investment). Tier 2 questions ask for additive combinations of two exponential processes (e.g.,
estimating the outperformance of stocks over bonds). Tier 3 questions ask for multiplicative
combinations of two exponential processes (e.g., estimating the future value of an investment and
adjusting it for fees). Tier 4 questions cover the additive combination of several exponential
processes with different times to maturity (e.g., estimating the future value of annual savings plan
contributions). Due to the high financial literacy of our student participants, the correct formula
should be obvious and known to most participants in Tier 1 (conceptual knowledge high, calculator
of great value). In contrast, the correct formula should be unknown to most participants in Tier 4
(conceptual knowledge low, calculator of little value).
MacKinnon and Wearing (1991) find systematic differences in the individuals’ ability to
accurately assess exponential growth and asymptotic decline. To account for these differences,
half of the questions is forward-looking (e.g., estimating the future value of an investment) and the
other half is backward-looking (e.g., estimating the present value of an investment).
The experiment concludes with a questionnaire on demographics, the financial situation, and
standardized scales on financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell 2017), numeracy (Weller et al.
2013), and cognitive reflection (CRT from Frederick 2005; REI-10 from Norris et al. 1998).
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Incentive Structure

Participants can earn up to 29 Euro, consisting of three parts: A fix show-up fee (10 Euro), a
variable payment based on the accuracy of answers in the estimation task (0-15 Euro), and a
variable payment based on the confidence statements in the confidence task (0-4 Euro). The entire
incentive structure was explained extensively in the instructions prior to the main experimental
task. To keep the instructions short and concise, we did not prove incentive compatibility formally
but assured to participants that they cannot benefit from consciously misspecifying their answers
and that it is therefore in their best interest to state their beliefs and preferences truthfully.
The accuracy of answers in the estimation task is measured in absolute error percentages (i.e., 𝐴𝐸𝑃
in Stage 1 and 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑐 in Stage 2, which we use synonymously for the remainder of Subsection 3.2).
𝐴𝐸𝑃 reduces the payment from the estimation task linearly with the restriction that the payment
cannot become negative:
𝜋estimation = 15 Euro ∙ (1 − min{𝐴𝐸𝑃; 1}) .

(5)

A table illustrating the effects of 𝐴𝐸𝑃 on the payment is handed out to participants prior to the
start of the experiment (Appendix A). The implemented incentive structure in the estimation task
implies that estimation errors are more costly when the correct answer (𝑥 ∗ ) is lower (see Equations
1-3). This may impose an incentive to state answers in the estimation task which are below the
participant’s own expectation. We will address this concern in Section 4.4 and invalidate it based
on the experimental data.
In the confidence task, participants state a probability 𝑝 that their answer is within a ±10% interval
around the correct answer. The payment is based on a quadratic scoring rule:

Cordes, Foltice, Langer (2019): Misperception of Exponential Growth: Are People Aware of their Errors?

𝜋confidence = 4 Euro ∙ {

(2 ∙ 𝑝 − 𝑝2 )
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if AEP < 10%
otherwise.
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(6)

Strictly speaking, the quadratic scoring rule is incentive compatible only under risk neutral
preferences (see e.g., Murphy and Winkler 1970 or Selten 1998 for detailed discussions). Hollard
et al. (2010) however do not find meaningful differences in calibration between a quadratic scoring
rule and two rules that do not depend on risk preferences in an experimental study. Therefore, we
are confident that the quadratic scoring rule employed in our setup induces truthful response.
Participants are paid according to their answers in one of the 14 questions. To determine this
question, each participant draws a ball out of a concealed urn with 14 numbered ping-pong balls
after the experiment. This procedure aims at strengthening trust in how the payment is determined.
We employ a standard Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to decide whether estimate
and confidence statement from Stage 1 (no calculator) or Stage 2 (with calculator) are used (Becker
et al. 1964). The computer randomly selects a price for the calculator (0-15 Euro). If the WTP
(also 0-15 Euro) is lower than the price, answer and confidence statement from Stage 1 (no
calculator) determine the payment. If the WTP is higher than the price, answer and confidence
statement from Stage 2 (with calculator) determine the payment, but the price for the calculator is
subtracted (payments could not become negative). Thus, the WTP should reflect the anticipated
benefits of the calculator, i.e., the difference in anticipated payments between Stage 1 (no
calculator) and Stage 2 (with calculator).
A key feature of our experimental approach is the within-subject design, which allows exploring
how the provision of arithmetic assistance affects the accuracy of answers and the confidence in
providing a precise answer. This is crucial for the discussion of whether participants are aware of
their errors and their specific drivers. Yet, the within-subject design requires special care when
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evaluating the behavioral impact of the incentives on our participants’ judgment and decision
making. To give an example: If a participant states a high WTP for the calculator, it is unlikely
that the answer from Stage 1 (no calculator) is relevant for payment. This reduces the expected
return to effort in Stage 1, which may reduce the quality of answers in Stage 1. Such a mechanism
would compromise the interpretation of WTP and its correlation to the accuracy of answers. We
will discuss such concerns in more detail in Subsection 4.4, and invalidate them with our
experimental data. A second caveat related to our incentive structure is that it is not fully immune
to strategic behavior. We designed incentives to be simple, intuitive and easy to grasp, such that
participants do not worry about having misunderstood the experimental task and the incentive
structure. This comes at the cost that participants who feel very unsure about their estimation
abilities but are very insightful with respect to the incentive structure can strategically exploit the
system. They could consciously provide very bad estimates to score at least for their perfectly
calibrated prediction of having provided a very bad estimate. From previous experiments, we did
not expect to see such strategic behavior of participants, and we will show in Subsection 4.4 that
there is indeed no sign of it in the data.

3.3

Procedure

The experiment was conducted in the computer labs of a German university. Participants were
second year undergraduate business students. As compound interest is taught extensively in the
first year of the program, most participants should understand the general concept of exponential
growth and know the basic formulas. Participation in the experiment was voluntary and N = 79
students took part. Given the complicated incentive structure, special attention was paid to the
comprehension of the instructions. We exclude 3 participants from the main analysis because they
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revealed severe problems in the check-up questions after the instructions. It took participants about
one hour to complete the entire experiment and the average payment was 17.26 Euro. Table 1
shows sample characteristics. As highlighted earlier, we deliberately recruited participants with
high financial literacy and numerical abilities. This is reflected in the respective test scores. Albeit
evidence amounts that financial literacy and (awareness of) misperceptions of exponential growth
have distinct effects on financial decision making. Stango and Zinman (2009, p. 2845) conclude
that: “[...] financial sophistication and bias have distinct effects on financial decisions. It may be
useful to conceive of bias and awareness of bias as dimensions of sophistication”. Using a more
sophisticated proxy for financial literacy, Almenberg and Gerdes (2012) also conclude that the two
are distinct constructs measuring knowledge and cognitive skills respectively. This should be kept
in mind when discussing the scope of our findings.

Table 1: Sample characteristics.
Mean
Gender (1=female)
35.53%
Age (in years)
22.59
Financial literacy score (4=best, Lusardi and Mitchell 2017)
3.93
Numeracy score (10=best, Weller et al. 2013)
9.30
Cognitive reflection score (3=highest, Frederick 2005)
2.12
Descriptive statistics on sample characteristics (N = 76 participants).

4

Median
0
22
4
10
2

Min.
0
19
3
7
0

Max.
1
30
4
10
3

Findings

Before exploring our main hypotheses, we feel that it is important to validate some assumptions
we have made with respect to our experimental setup (all experimental data can be obtained from
the authors upon request). Given the rather complicated incentive structure, we first want to verify
that our participants properly understood the experimental task – otherwise, many of our later
arguments may lose their foundation. Participants seem to have understood the instructions well
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as can be learned from the number of errors in the check-up questions of the instructions: On
median, participants answered 6 out of 7 questions correctly at first attempt (mean: 5.83). This is
also reflected in the self-rated understanding: On a seven point Likert-type scale (where seven is
best), the median participant assigned a rating of 7 for the understandability of the instructions in
general (mean: 6.25) and a rating of 6 for the understandability of the incentive structure in
particular (mean: 5.81). To address the concern that our results are driven by misunderstandings
among participants, we conducted strict robustness checks and excluded participants with more
than one error in the check-up questions from the analyses (N = 18 in total). All results reported in
this study remain qualitatively unchanged.
As our participants are trained in assessing exponential growth, they may be sensitized towards its
pitfalls. This could eliminate or even reverse the bias, which would compromise the external
validity of our findings. For a quick analysis of the general pattern of EGB we look at the signed
error percentage 𝐸𝑃 as defined in Section 2. EGB, operationalized as in Stango and Zinman
(2009), predicts an underestimation of the correct answer for forward-looking questions (𝐸𝑃 < 0)
and an overestimation for backward-looking questions (𝐸𝑃 > 0). Across all tiers, the median 𝐸𝑃
is -0.54 for forward-looking questions and 0.41 for backward-looking questions in Stage 1 (no
calculator).3 Thus, even our financially literate participants fall prey to EGB, suggesting that our
experimental findings on absolute error percentages 𝐴𝐸𝑃 are extendable beyond the specific
subject pool.
The Tier-system is set up with the intention to produce a high level of conceptual knowledge in
Tier 1 up to a low level in Tier 4. To evaluate whether the goal was achieved, we proxy conceptual
knowledge by the fraction of “proper” answers in Stage 2, where judgment accuracy is only
determined by conceptual knowledge. We define an answer to be “proper” if it is within a ±10%
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interval around the correct answer, i.e. 𝐴𝐸𝑃 < 10% (Stage 1) or 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑐 < 10% (Stage 2) respectively.
We allow some deviation from the exact answer, because rounding errors can amplify in Tiers
where multiple computational steps are necessary to derive the answer. The interval size is set to
±10% as it simplifies the calibration discussion later on (participants were confronted with ±10%
intervals in their confidence statements). The fraction of proper answers in Stage 2 declines
monotonically from 89.47% in Tier 1, 86.84% in Tier 2, 78.29% in Tier 3, down to only 9.87% in
Tier 4 (Appendix E). Although we hoped for a more gradual decline, we conclude that the Tiersystem produces variation in conceptual knowledge as expected.

4.1

Awareness of Errors when Judging Exponential Growth

We predicted that participants are overconfident in their ability to judge exponential growth
̂ < 𝐴𝐸𝑃. We explore this presumption by comparing the fraction of proper
intuitively, i.e. 𝐴𝐸𝑃
answers (𝐴𝐸𝑃 < 10%) to the average confidence participants state that their answer is proper
̂ < 10%). If participants are overconfident, the average confidence in having provided a
(𝐴𝐸𝑃
proper answer is higher than the actual fraction. Supporting our prediction, Table 2 shows that
confidence is significantly higher than the fraction of proper answers in all Tiers of Stage 1. Thus,
participants seem to be overconfident in the accuracy of their intuitive judgment.4
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Table 2: Average confidence and fraction of proper answers in Stage 1 (no calculator).
Tier
N
Confidence in answer
Fraction of proper answers
Difference
All
1,064
37.26%
7.90%
29.36% ***
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Tier 1
456
41.77%
10.96%
30.81% ***
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
Tier 2
152
32.09%
5.26%
26.83% ***
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
Tier 3
304
33.58%
7.57%
26.01% ***
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.03)
Tier 4
152
36.24%
1.97%
34.26% ***
(0.03)
(0.0)
(0.03)
Tier 4-1
-5.53% **
-8.99% ***
-3.46%
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.03)
Average confidence and fraction of proper answers in Stage 1 (no calculator), by Tiers. An answer is considered
“proper” if 𝐴𝐸𝑃 < 10% (Stage 1) or 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑐 < 10% (Stage 2) respectively. Cluster-robust standard errors are provided
in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, 10% level.

We next look at calibration curves for a more profound analysis of overconfidence. We assign
confidence statements to 20% bins, and plot the average confidence against the fraction of proper
answers within each bin. Panel A of Figure 2 depicts the calibration curve in Stage 1 (all Tiers
combined). The curve is upward-sloping, but well below the identity line: Participants somewhat
adapt their confidence to the accuracy of their answers, but they are generally overconfident.

Figure 2: Panel A shows the calibration curve in Stage 1 (no calculator). Panel B shows the calibration curve where
only Stage 1 answers are considered if the participant gave a proper answer to the same question in Stage 2 (with
calculator). Panel C shows the calibration curve in Stage 2 (with calculator). An answer is considered “proper” if 𝐴𝐸𝑃
< 10% (Stage 1) or 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑐 < 10% (Stage 2) respectively. Confidence statements are collapsed in the intervals [0;0.2],
(0.2;0.4], (0.4;0.6], (0.6;0.8], (0.8;1.0]. Numbers above the scatters indicate the number of observations within the
interval.
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To assess overconfidence in arithmetic abilities, Panel B controls for conceptual problems. This is
done by only considering Stage 1 answers that come from participants who have no conceptual
problems (i.e., who gave a proper answer in Stage 2 with calculator). By visual inspection, the
curve is marginally steeper compared to Panel A, but it remains well below the identity line. Thus,
participants are overconfident in their arithmetic abilities in particular, indicating that they do not
sufficiently grasp the computational component of their error.
To assess the confidence-accuracy calibration with respect to conceptual abilities, Panel C shows
the calibration curve in Stage 2 (all Tiers combined). Albeit we did not formulate concrete
expectations, analyzing this relationship promises to advance the understanding of the participants’
introspection into the main drivers of their errors when judging exponential growth. Consistent to
the hard-easy effect (e.g., Lichtenstein and Fischhoff 1977), participants are underconfident for
low confidence levels (where the hard Tier 4 questions predominate) and somewhat overconfident
for high confidence levels (where the easy Tier 1 questions predominate). Considering the fact that
the vast majority of responses fall into the highest confidence bin (817 out of 1,064) where
calibration is fairly good, comparing Panel C to Panel B suggests that calibration of conceptual
abilities is better than calibration of arithmetic abilities. This implies that overconfidence in
conceptual abilities is not the main driver of any misperceptions of the benefits of the calculator,
which we will analyze in the following section.
Taken together, the data confirms our prediction: Participants are overconfident in their ability to
judge exponential growth accurately, indicating that they are not fully aware of their errors. To
reduce the detrimental effects of misperceptions of exponential growth on financial decision
making, policy making could consider prompting individuals prior to making exponential growthrelated decisions that their intuitive judgment is error-prone. We further find that participants are
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overconfident in their arithmetic abilities, whereas they are somewhat accurately calibrated
regarding their conceptual abilities. The following subsection addresses this point in more detail
by studying the WTP for a standard pocket calculator, which eliminates arithmetic problems but
does not help at overcoming arithmetic abilities.

4.2

Relation between Willingness to Pay for and Benefits of Calculator Use

We now turn to the question whether participants sufficiently appreciate the opportunity to
counteract the arithmetic component of their errors by employing computational assistance. Wellcalibrated individuals should state a WTP that is equal to the benefits of the calculator, i.e., the
improvement of payments between Stage 1 (no calculator) and Stage 2 (with calculator).
We predicted that the WTP is lower than the benefits of the calculator. The previous findings
nurture this presumption and support our previous reasoning: Overconfidence in the quality of
one’s judgment should make assistance look less relevant.
Panel A of Table 3 contrasts the WTP with the benefits of the calculator. Contradicting our
prediction, the WTP is significantly higher than the benefits (Δ = 8.52 - 7.04 = 1.48 Euro, p < 0.01).
This is surprising, considering the pervasive overconfidence documented in Subsection 4.1.
Looking at the relation between WTP and benefits across Tiers yields an intuition for this finding.
While the benefits of the calculator decrease from 8.23 Euro in Tier 1 to 1.62 Euro in Tier 4 (Δ =
-6.61 Euro, p < 0.01), the WTP remains constant across Tiers (Δ = 0.38 Euro, p = 0.20). This
results in an increasing gap between WTP and the benefits of the calculator, from 0.04 Euro in
Tier 1 to 7.03 Euro in Tier 4 (Δ = 6.99 Euro, p < 0.01).
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Table 3: Willingness to pay (WTP) for the pocket calculator and benefits provided by the calculator.
Panel A
Panel B
Proper answers Confidence
N
WTP
Benefits
Difference
Stage 2
Stage 2
Difference
All
1,064
8.52
7.04
1.48 ***
74.53%
81.17%
-6.64% ***
(0.46)
(0.33)
(0.48)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Tier 1
456
8.27
8.23
0.04
89.47%
88.63%
0.84%
(0.45)
(0.39)
(0.48)
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
Tier 2
152
8.62
8.00
0.62
86.84%
83.39%
3.45%
(0.51)
(0.50)
(0.68)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
Tier 3
304
8.78
7.49
1.29 **
78.29%
79.86%
-1.57%
(0.50)
(0.48)
(0.62)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
Tier 4
152
8.65
1.62
7.03 ***
9.87%
59.19%
-49.32% ***
(0.52)
(0.52)
(0.72)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.04)
Tier 4-1
0.38
-6.61 ***
6.99 ***
-79.60%
-29.44% *** -50.16% ***
(0.30)
(0.59)
(0.66)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.05)
Descriptive statistics on the WTP (in Euro), benefits of the calculator (in Euro), fraction of proper answers in Stage 2
(in %), and confidence in Stage 2 (in %). An answer is considered “proper” if 𝐴𝐸𝑃 < 10% (Stage 1) or 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑐 < 10%
(Stage 2) respectively. Cluster-robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical
significance on the 1%, 5%, 10% level, based on two-sided t-tests.

Interestingly, the confidence in being able to give a proper answer in Stage 2 systematically
decreases from Tier 1 to Tier 4 (Panel B of Table 3). The reduction in confidence does not match
the actual reduction in the fraction of proper answers (from 89.47% in Tier 1 to 9.87% in Tier 4),
but is significant (from 88.63% in Tier 1 to 59.19% in Tier 4, Δ = -29.44%, p < 0.01). The fact that
the WTP does not adapt to the declining confidence in Stage 2 is puzzling and calls for a more
general inspection of potential WTP determinants.
Before we do so in the next subsection, we shortly assess our prediction that the WTP for the
calculator is positively related to the benefits it provides. Model 1 of Table 4 shows the results of
an OLS regression with the benefits of calculator use (the difference between Stage 2- and Stage
1-payment for the same question) regressed on the WTP for the use of a calculator for this question.
The model shows that the benefits of the calculator are positively correlated to WTP (β = 0.08,
p = 0.04), supporting our prediction. It should be noted though that the effect is small: WTP
increases by only 0.08 Euro for every 1 Euro the calculator improves payments, while it should
increase by 1 Euro (β = 1). Model 2 of Table 4 verifies that a larger effect is not masked by
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individuals who falsely believe to know the correct formula and therefore misperceive the benefits
of the calculator; even after controlling for conceptual knowledge, provided benefits affect WTP
only weakly (β = -0.0002 + 0.12 = 0.12, p = 0.03).

Table 4: Drivers of the willingness to pay for the pocket calculator (WTP).
(1)
(2)
(3)
Provided benefits
0.08 **
-0.0002
(0.04)
(0.07)
Know formula (1=yes)
-0.63
(0.71)
Know formula x
0.12 *
provided benefits
(0.07)
Shortfall payments Stage 1
0.11 **
(0.05)
Know formula x
shortfall payments Stage 1
Confidence Stage 1

(4)

(5)

1.06
(1.14)

0.14
(0.09)
-0.02
(0.09)

-5.57 ***
(1.42)
Confidence increase Stage 2
1.85 **
(0.90)
Intercept
7.96 ***
8.14 ***
7.41 ***
6.43 ***
9.78 ***
(0.55)
(0.58)
(0.71)
(1.22)
(0.94)
Adj. R2
0.01
0.02
0.01
0.02
0.19
N
1,064
1,064
1,064
1,064
1,064
Effects on WTP from OLS regressions. “x” denotes an interaction. Cluster-robust standard errors are provided in
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance on the 1%, 5%, 10% level.

4.3

Other Determinants of WTP

Given that the actual benefits of calculator use are hardly related to the WTP for calculator access,
we should explore some other potential determinants of the WTP. First we examine whether WTP
is simply driven by the magnitude of the errors in Stage 1. Participants might well grasp how much
potential there is for improvement but not factor in that conceptual problems will limit the benefits
of calculator assistance. To proxy the magnitude of errors, we use the shortfall of payments in
Stage 1 (no calculator) from the maximum payment in the estimation task (15 Euro), which
participants receive if they know the correct formula and state the correct answer in Stage 2 (with
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calculator). We use this indirect and restricted measure of the error magnitude, because the
relationship between WTP and the shortfall of payments is better interpretable than the relationship
between WTP and more direct error measures. Because higher errors translate into higher
shortfalls, we would thus predict a positive correlation between WTP and the shortfall of
payments. Model 3 of Table 4 supports this prediction: For every 1 Euro that the error reduces
payments in Stage 1, the WTP for the calculator increases by β = 0.11 Euro (p = 0.03). It is
noteworthy though that the effect is again small and that the major part of the WTP cannot be
explained by the shortfall of payments.
To obtain a clearer picture of how the WTP is shaped by the different components of the error, we
again control for conceptual knowledge. Participants who give a proper answer in Stage 2 (with
calculator) know the correct formula and have no conceptual problems. For those participants, the
error in Stage 1 (no calculator) is entirely owed to their arithmetic problems (where the calculator
helps) and they should state a WTP of 1 Euro for every 1 Euro the payment in Stage 1 falls short
of the maximum (i.e., the effect should be β = 1). Participants who do not give a proper answer in
Stage 2 (with calculator) most likely do not know the correct formula and cannot benefit from the
calculator; they should state a WTP of 0 Euro and the effect should be β = 0. Model 4 of Table 4
checks this proposition by interacting the shortfall of payments from Stage 1 (no calculator) with
a dummy variable indicating whether participants gave a proper answer in Stage 2 (i.e., whether
they know the formula). Participants who know the formula increase their WTP by β = 0.14 – 0.02
= 0.12 Euro (p = 0.03) for every 1 Euro the payment in Stage 1 falls short of the maximum
payment. The effect is well below the benchmark of well-calibrated individuals (β = 1), illustrating
that participants do not sufficiently grasp the magnitude of their arithmetic problems. Interestingly,
neither the effect of the payment shortfall nor the WTP base-level differ significantly between
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participants who know and do not know the formula (difference in effect-size: Δβ = -0.02, p = 0.83;
difference in base-level: Δα = 1.06, p = 0.36). This suggests that participants do not understand
how conceptual problems affect the accuracy of their judgment.
With the main part of the WTP still unexplained by the factors that should be expected to determine
it (Models 1-4) we finally explore whether the WTP is simply determined by how little confidence
participants have in their judgment. Model 5 of Table 4 relates the WTP for the calculator to the
confidence in providing a proper answer in Stage 1 (no calculator) and the confidence-increase
due to the availability of the calculator (difference in confidence between Stages 2 and 1).
Interestingly, the confidence in providing a proper answer in Stage 1 (no calculator) has a strong
negative impact on WTP: The difference in WTP between participants who are 0% and 100%
confident is 5.57 Euro on average (p < 0.01). This speaks in favor of a notion that there is some
general aversion towards decision making in a situation with little confidence involved and in
particular less confidence than necessary. This is supported by the fact that the confidence increase
due to the availability of the calculator also has a strong (positive) impact on WTP (β = 1.85,
p = 0.04).
To sum up, the demand for arithmetic assistance is mostly unrelated to the benefits of the assistance
(Model 1-2), the error size (Model 3) and arithmetic and conceptual problems (Model 4). Instead,
the demand seems to be mainly determined by a lack of confidence in the own intuitive judgment,
and by the anticipated increase in confidence due to the availability of assistance (Model 5). This
suggests that individuals are keen to accept any form of assistance, independent of the actual
benefit it provides – at least if they are put into a position where they recognize how little
confidence they have in their intuitive judgment and how it compares to the (supposedly) higher
confidence in a decision situation where assistance is available.
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Alternative Explanations

Subsection 3.2 discussed how our experimental design may impose potential problems to the
interpretation of our data. This subsection is dedicated to discussing these concerns in more detail,
and invalidate them based on our experimental data.
The within-subject design may systematically bias the WTP and thereby its correlation to other
variables. Stating a high WTP for the calculator reduces the probability that the answer from Stage
1 (no calculator) becomes relevant for payment. Thus, increasing the WTP reduces the expected
return to effort in Stage 1, which may reduce the quality of estimates in Stage 1 (because
participants rely on their “second chance” of providing a good estimate in Stage 2). This could
bias the correlation between WTP and the benefits of the calculator (Table 3), as well as the
correlation between the WTP and the shortfall of payments (Table 4). To address this concern, we
regress the WTP on the time in minutes participants spend on answering a question (as a proxy for
the effort put into the answer). Model 1 and 2 of Table 5 show that WTP does not affect the time
spent on answering a question in Stage 1 and 2 respectively. Therefore, it seems unlikely that WTP
systematically affects the effort and thereby the quality of answers.

Table 5: Invalidation of alternative explanations.
(1) Time spent on
(2) Time spent on
(3) Confidence in
(4) Confidence in
answering a question answering a question providing a proper
providing a proper
in Stage 1
in Stage 2
answer in Stage 1
answer in Stage 2
Willingness to pay
-0.03
0.02
-0.03 ***
0.002
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.004)
Constant
2.02 ***
1.21 ***
0.59 ***
0.80
(0.22)
(0.08)
(0.05)
(0.04)
Adj. R2
0.01
0.003
0.18
0.001
N
1,064
1,064
1,064
1,064
Effect of WTP on the total time in minutes spent on answering a question in Stage 1 (Model 1) and in Stage 2 (Model
2), and the confidence of providing a proper answer in Stage 1 (Model 3) and in Stage 2 (Model 4) from OLS
regressions. Cluster-robust standard errors are provided in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance on
the 1%, 5%, 10% level.
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WTP may also bias the confidence in providing a proper answer in Stage 1: Stating a high WTP
reduces the probability that the stated confidence in the Stage 1-answer is relevant for payment.
Thus, participants who state a high WTP know that the confidence in the Stage 1-answer is
probably irrelevant for payment, and may consciously overstate their confidence (e.g., due to social
desirability). In Stage 2, knowing that their answer now matters, they state the correct confidence.
Those participants would be approximately maximizing their payments, and they may even be
correctly calibrated. Yet, the measures reported in Table 2 and Figure 2 would classify them as
being overconfident in Stage 1. Model 3 of Table 5 shows that WTP negatively predicts the
confidence in providing a proper answer in Stage 1. This speaks directly against the mechanism
outlined above, and supports our original notion that WTP expresses a lack of confidence in
providing a proper answer in Stage 1 (see also Model 5 of Table 4). Participants who state a low
WTP may follow the opposite pattern (i.e., correct confidence in Stage 1 and overly high
confidence in Stage 2 due to social desirability). Our measures would classify those participants
as being overconfident in Stage 2. Yet, WTP does not affect stated confidence in Stage 2 (Model
4 of Table 5). All this suggests that participants do not systematically state very high confidence
levels (e.g., due to social desirability) if their answer is likely not relevant for payment. This lends
support to the validity of our findings on overconfidence.
Our experimental incentive structure is a compromise between strict incentive compatibility and
understandability. Existing research shows that performance-based incentives can improve
diligence and judgement quality (Camerer and Hogarth 1999). Given the repetitive nature of our
experimental task (participants answered 2x14 questions), we believe that linking participant
remuneration to accuracy generally improves diligence. Yet, enforcing strict incentive
compatibility comes at the cost of a much more complicated incentive structure. As we were

Cordes, Foltice, Langer (2019): Misperception of Exponential Growth: Are People Aware of their Errors?

24

concerned that participants worry about their misconception of the experimental task, we refrained
from enforcing strict incentive compatibility. The implemented incentive structure in the
estimation task implies that estimation errors are more costly when the correct answer (𝑥 ∗ ) is lower
(see Equations 2, 3, and 5). This imposes an incentive to state answers in the estimation task which
are below the own expectation. Yet, we believe that the vast majority of participants does not
exploit this subtle loophole by systematically stating answers below their expectation. Existing
literature on EGB provides indirect evidence for this presumption, as similar levels of inaccuracy
have been observed in experiments with very different incentive structures, from offering no
compensation at all to enforcing strict incentive compatibility. 5 To address this presumption
directly with our experimental data, we regressed the correct answer (𝑥 ∗ ) on a dummy variable
indicating whether a participant underestimated the correct answer in an (unreported) probit
model; we find that the magnitude of the correct answer positively affects the probability of
underestimating the correct answer (p < 0.01). In other words: The lower the correct answer, the
lower the probability of underestimating the correct answer. This speaks directly against the
concern that the linear relation between error size and payments from the estimation task induces
a downward bias in given answers when the correct answer is particularly low.
Also for reasons of simplicity, the quadratic scoring rule in the confidence task only takes the
probability for providing an answer within the ±10% interval around the correct answer into
account (see Equation 6), rather than the whole distribution of errors. This may impose an incentive
to state more predictable answers. For example, a participant who thinks there is a 50% chance her
estimate is within the ±10% interval expects a payment of 3 Euro in the confidence task from
reporting her confidence truthfully. However, she could revise her estimate to one that is definitely
wrong, report a confidence of 0%, and earn 4 Euro in the confidence task for sure (note that
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participants who truly behave strategically would not state a nonsensical answer in the estimation
task and then a confidence of e.g. 1% or 2%). Albeit this is not a dominant strategy (stating a
nonsensical answer reduces the expected payoff in the estimation task), some participants may
engage in such strategic decision making. The experimental data shows that this is not a
widespread behavior among participants. Only 4.23% of answers in Stage 1 and 2.44% of answers
in Stage 2 report a confidence of 0%, and almost none of them appeared in combination with
completely nonsensical estimates.
In sum, we find no concrete evidence that our within subject design or our incentive structure
induces participants to systematically and strategically misspecify their answers. This lends
support to the validity of our findings regarding the awareness of errors in judging exponential
growth and their specific drivers.

5

Conclusion

This study explores whether individuals are aware of their errors when answering exponential
growth-related household finance questions, and whether they understand how these errors are
shaped by arithmetic and conceptual problems.
The arithmetic problems stem from the mere inability to conduct the proper calculations in one’s
head and could be overcome by employing a pocket calculator. The errors remaining even with a
pocket calculator stem from conceptual problems, a term we use to subsume all other error drivers
(like a general misunderstanding of exponential growth or overwhelming task complexity), which
increases the susceptibility for errors.
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Our participants are overconfident in their ability to judge exponential growth intuitively,
indicating that they are not (fully) aware of the magnitude of their errors. Interestingly, they reveal
at the same time a strong preference for obtaining arithmetic assistance (a simple calculator) to
improve their judgment and are willing to pay a price for such assistance that outweighs its
benefits. Our experimental design allows to conclude that the WTP is hardly related to the benefits
the assistance provides or the magnitude of the errors. The strongest (negative) predictor of WTP
is the confidence of our participants in the quality of their judgment in Stage 1. That is, they are
particularly interested in employing calculator support when they perceive the task to be difficult
and mostly neglect the fact that conceptual problems limit the benefits of the assistance.
Our findings advance the understanding of the motives and drivers of individual behavior in
exponential growth-related decision situations and will stimulate further research on effective
decision support. Albeit individuals generally underestimate the magnitude of their errors, they are
keen on using assistance – even if it is offered at a significant price or involves significant effort.
The interest in such support is not driven by a profound introspection into its benefits, not to speak
of an understanding of the interplay of arithmetic and conceptual problems but rather by a general
aversion towards decision making in a situation where they have less confidence in their judgment
than necessary.
Our findings are also important to guide policy making in its attempts to improve financial decision
making of private households in exponential growth-related decision problems. They suggest that
assistance does not need to be mandatory when individuals make (exponential growth-based)
financial decisions. They seem to have a strong interest in using it when they realize how little
confidence they have into their intuitive judgment. The latter can be achieved by making the
shortcomings of the intuitive judgment salient as we do in our experiment. The question which of
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our experimental design features (the explicit offering of support, the confidence elicitation for
intuitive judgment, or something else) is the strongest driver for the phenomenon is not explicitly
addressed in this paper but left for future research.6 The fact that we explored the behavior of
financially literate business students and find hardly any relation between their interest in decision
support and its actual benefits further supports the relevance of our research. Less literate
individuals can be expected to rely even more on general heuristics instead of sensible cost-benefit
considerations.
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Endnotes
1

For instance, teaching the “rule of 72” (Eisenstein and Hoch 2007) or basic compound interest
formulas (Foltice and Langer 2017) improves the judgment of exponential growth. Sampling
experiences with exponential growth, either in real life (Keren 1983) or in laboratory settings
(MacKinnon and Wearing 1991), seems to train the intuitive understanding of exponential
growth and mitigate misperceptions. Foltice (2015) shows that teaching formal or informal
rules as well as experience sampling improves the judgment of exponential growth immediately
after the intervention, but is not very persistent.

2

̂ should be modeled as a distribution of beliefs about the
In a more elaborate error analysis, 𝐴𝐸𝑃
size of 𝐴𝐸𝑃. But as we are not interested in the specifics of this distribution, we collapse it into
̂ measures error awareness, but not EGB awareness in its
a single best estimate. Note that 𝐴𝐸𝑃
̂,
typical directional sense. Our participants’ best guess with respect to their signed error, i.e. 𝐸𝑃
is bound to be zero if participants properly react to the given incentives.

3

Appendix D contains cumulative distribution functions of 𝐸𝑃. In Stage 1 (no calculator),
median answers across all Tiers are biased in the direction as predicted by EGB; negative sign
for forward-looking questions and positive sign for backward-looking questions. An exception
are backward-looking Tier 2 questions, where EGB predicts a positive sign for very high levels
of biasedness and a negative sign for moderate levels of biasedness (which we find).

4

Strictly speaking, this pattern indicates overprecision, which is considered a specific dimension
of overconfidence (e.g., Griffin and Brenner 2007). For sakes of simplicity, we do not make
this subtle distinction.
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Most EGB studies do not link remuneration to accuracy. Stango and Zinman (2009) use
unincentivized survey data. McKenzie and Liersch (2011) offer their student participants partial
course credit (no grades) for participation (experiments 1-3). Eisenstein and Hoch (2007) offer
their participants a fix monetary payment for participation (experiments 2-3). Only few EGB
studies link remuneration to accuracy. Similar to our approach, Foltice and Langer (2017) link
remuneration linearly to the estimation error. Levy and Tasoff (2015) link remuneration
piecewise linearly to the estimation error. Levy and Tasoff (2017) link remuneration to a
quadratic scoring rule in accuracy.

6

Levy and Tasoff (2017) do not elicit the (confidence in the) own judgment prior to eliciting the
interest in decision support tools in a similar experimental task. They do not find such a strong
interest in decision support tools, indicating that the confidence elicitation in our experimental
setup raises the participants’ awareness of the vagueness of their intuitive judgment and in turn
the WTP for the calculator.
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Appendix A: Written introduction.
Page 1:
Dear experiment participant,
Welcome to our experiment. We would like to thank you in advance for your participation. Participants of previous
experiments have let us know that they perceived economic experiments as very exciting. We hope that you will
share this feeling.
Our experiment is divided into three sections. In section 1, you will have to estimate the correct answer to 14
mathematical questions only using a pen and a paper. After having completed section 1, we will provide you with
a standard pocket calculator which you are allowed to use in sections 2 and 3. In section 2, you will have to estimate
the correct answer to the same 14 mathematical questions as in section 1. Section 3 is a concluding questionnaire.
You will receive a fixed payment of 10 Euro for participating in our experiment. In addition to that, you will receive
a variable payment of up to 19 Euro. The variable payment is based, among other things, on the precision of your
answers in sections 1 and 2.
Specifically, the variable payment will be based on the precision of your answer to one single answer and not the
average precision of all your given answers. Therefore, it is in your best interest to think carefully about all answers
that you give in this experiment – even if you had troubles answering some of the previous questions. For
determining which question will be used for determining the variable payment, you will draw a numbered ball out
of an urn with 14 balls after having completed the experiment. A more detailed explanation of the exact payment
rules will follow at the relevant stages during the experiment.
Please note that is strictly forbidden to use any devices that you brought along (e.g. pocket calculators, cell phones)
and the internet during this experiment. You are also not allowed to talk to fellow students during the experiment
or to look at other screens. A violation of these rules will cause an immediate exclusion without pay from the
experiment.
In a few moments, you will receive the login details that are needed for starting the experiment together with a pen
and a piece of paper from us.
We will explain the directly following subtasks before each section starts. It is strictly required that you carefully
read and comprehend the instructions and tutorials for every section.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions during the experiment. The experimenter will immediately come
and assist you.
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Page 2:
The variable payment
Additionally to the 10 Euro show-up fee, you will receive a variable payment upon completing this experiment.
The variable payment is based on the precision of your answer to one randomly chosen question.
Precision is measured in absolute error percentages (𝐴𝐸𝑃):
𝐴𝐸𝑃 =

|your answer − correct answer|
correct answer

Your variable payoff is determined by the formula:
your payoff = 15 Euro − 15 Euro ∙ 𝐴𝐸𝑃
The following table gives an overview of what your variable payoff looks like for various answers (assuming that
the correct answer is 100):
Correct answer
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

Your answer
<0
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
190
200
> 200

𝑨𝑬𝑷
100%
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
100%

Please note that the 𝐴𝐸𝑃 measure is restricted in the experiment to not exceed 100%.

Your payoff
0.00 Euro
0.00 Euro
1.50 Euro
3.00 Euro
4.50 Euro
6.00 Euro
7.50 Euro
9.00 Euro
10.50 Euro
12.00 Euro
13.50 Euro
15.00 Euro
13.50 Euro
12.00 Euro
10.50 Euro
9.00 Euro
7.50 Euro
6.00 Euro
4.50 Euro
3.00 Euro
1.50 Euro
0.00 Euro
0.00 Euro

Cordes, Foltice, Langer (2019): Misperception of Exponential Growth: Are People Aware of their Errors?

35

Appendix B: Experimental instructions.
Screen 1: Introduction
Welcome and thank you for participating in this experiment. Your assistance is highly appreciated. We are
interested in your uninfluenced judgment and decision making. Therefore, talking to other participants, looking at
other people’s screens, using the internet or personal devices that you brought along (e.g., cellphones) is strictly
prohibited and will disqualify you from the experiment without pay. Please click on “Continue”.

Screen 2: Introduction
The experiment consists of three sections:
- Section 1: 14 mathematical questions without calculator
- Section 2: 14 mathematical questions with calculator
- Section 3: Concluding questionnaire
In Section 1, you are supposed to estimate the answer to the 14 mathematical questions. You may use the pen and
paper provided by the experimenter. No calculators are allowed for Section 1. In Section 2, we will ask you the
same 14 mathematical questions, only this time you are allowed to use a calculator. Please notify the experimenter
by raising your hand once you have completed Section 1. The experimenter will come to your place and give you
a standard pocket calculator. Please click on “Continue”.

Screen 3: How you will be paid
Upon the completion of the experiment, you will be paid a 10 Euro show-up fee. Additionally, you will receive a
second payment according to the precision of your answers to the mathematical questions. The following formula
is used to determine your payoff:
your payoff = 15 Euro − 15 Euro ∙ 𝐴𝐸𝑃
𝐴𝐸𝑃 stands for Absolute Error Percentage and is a measure for the accuracy of your answer. It is determined by
the formula:
|your answer − correct answer|
𝐴𝐸𝑃 =
correct answer
Please click on “Continue”.

Screen 4: How you will be paid
Let’s assume that the correct answer is 100.00 for the following examples:
- If your answer is 50.00, your absolute deviation from the correct answer is 50% (i.e., 𝐴𝐸𝑃 = 50%) and your
payment will therefore be 15 Euro – 15 Euro ∙ 50% = 7.50 Euro.
- If your answer is 100.00, your absolute deviation from the correct answer is 0% (i.e., 𝐴𝐸𝑃 = 0%) and your
payment will therefore be 15 Euro – 15 Euro ∙ 0% = 15.00 Euro.
- If your answer is 150.00, your absolute deviation from the correct answer is 50% (i.e., 𝐴𝐸𝑃 = 50%) and
your payment will therefore be 15 Euro – 15 Euro ∙ 50% = 7.50 Euro.
You immediately see that you get the highest payment for giving the correct answer. Over- and underestimations
lead to a lower payment. Please note that the 𝐴𝐸𝑃 measure is restricted by the program to not exceed 100%.
Therefore, over- or underestimating the correct answer by more or less than 100% will not result in a negative
payment. Please refer to the printed table on your desk to see how other 𝐴𝐸𝑃s will affect your payment. Please
click on “Continue”.
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Screen 5: How you will be paid
As noted earlier, we will ask you the same 14 questions in Sections 1 and 2. In Section 1, you are not allowed to
use a calculator. In Section 2, you are allowed to use a calculator. We will not pay you according to the precision
of your answer to all 14 questions, but only according to the precision of your answer to one question. The relevant
question will be determined randomly after the experiment, so think carefully about all your answers. To determine
the question that will be paid out to you, you will draw a ball out of an urn with 14 balls (numbered from 1 to 14).
Please click on “Continue”.

Screen 6: How you will be paid
Once you have drawn the ball out of the urn, we still have to determine whether you will be paid according to your
Section 1 answer (without calculator) or your Section 2 answer to the same question (with calculator). To do so,
we will ask you after each question in Section 1 for a maximum fee (in Euro) that you are willing to pay in order
to be paid according to your answer to the same question in Section 2 (when the calculator is available) rather than
to be paid according to the answer that you just gave in Section 1 (when no calculator is available). The fee that
you state may lie between 0 and 15 Euro. After the experiment, the computer will randomly select an effective fee
that also lies between 0 and 15 Euro (all numbers are equally likely to occur).
- If the effective fee that was selected by the computer is lower than the fee that you have stated, you will be
paid according to your answer with the calculator. In this case, the effective fee will be subtracted from
your payment.
- If the effective fee that was selected by the computer is higher than the fee that you have stated, you will
be paid according to your answer without the calculator. In this case, the effective fee will not be subtracted
from your payment.
If the effective fee that was selected is higher than the variable payment that you would receive for your answer to
the mathematical question, you will receive a variable payment of 0 Euro (i.e., the payment cannot become
negative). Please click on “Continue”.

Screen 7: How you will be paid
We ask for your maximum acceptable fee to learn about the strength of your preference:
- If you state a low fee, this indicates that you are quite certain that your answer in Section 1 (without
calculator) is almost as accurate as the answer that you will give in Section 2 (with calculator).
- If you state a high fee, this indicates that you are quite certain that your answer in Section 1 (without
calculator) is much less accurate than the answer that you will give in Section 2 (with calculator).
The payout mechanism used in this experiment is called the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism. It is known
to be incentive compatible and it is therefore in your best interest to truthfully state your maximum acceptable fee.
We will not go into much detail here, but you can trust us that you cannot gain from consciously misspecifying
your preference. It is always in your best interest to give truthful answers to all questions. Please click on
“Continue”.

Screen 8: Confidence in your answers
After each question, we will additionally ask you about your confidence in the answer that you just gave.
Specifically, we will ask you: What do you think is the probability that your answer falls within a ±10% interval
around the correct answer? You may answer this question by stating a probability between 0 and 100%. You will
also get additional money for answering this question. The amount of money that you will receive is determined
by a so-called Quadratic-Scoring-Rule. Please click on “Continue”.
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Screen 9: Confidence in your answers
If your answer falls within a ±10% interval around the correct answer, you will additionally receive:
4 Euro ∙ (2 ∙ 𝑝 − 𝑝2 ) ,
where 𝑝 is the probability that you have stated. If your answer does not fall within a ±10% interval around the
correct answer, you will additionally receive:
4 Euro ∙ (1 − 𝑝2 ) .
The overall payout for your stated probability ranges from 0 to 4 Euro and is paid on top of all other payments.
We will again not go into much detail here, but you can trust us that you cannot gain from consciously misspecifying your beliefs. You maximize your expected payment if you truthfully state the probability that you
believe. Please click on “Continue”.

Screen 10: Summary
To sum up, you will be paid in the following ways:
- You will receive a 10 Euro show-up fee for completing the experiment.
- After the experiment, you will draw a ball out of an urn with 14 balls to determine the question that will be
paid out to you. This variable payment may be up to 15 Euro and will be paid out in addition to the 10 Euro
show-up fee.
- After each question in Section 1 (without calculator), we will ask for your maximum acceptable fee in order
to be paid according to your answer in Stage 2 (with calculator) rather than your answer to the same question
in Section 1 (without calculator). Then, the computer randomly selects an effective fee: If your stated fee
is higher than the effective fee, you will be paid based on your Section 2 answer (minus the effective fee).
If your stated fee is lower than the effective fee, you will be paid based on your Section 1 answer (the fee
is irrelevant in this case).
- Finally, we will ask you after each question in Section 1 and 2 about the confidence in your answer. You
will get up to 4 Euro based on the probability that you have stated and whether your answer falls within the
±10% interval around the correct answer
Please click on “Continue”.

Screen 11: Section 1
You have now completed the tutorial. Please click on “Continue” to start Section 1.

Screens 12-25: Questions Section 1 (without calculator)
Question texts are specified in Appendix C.

Screen 26: Section 2
You have now completed Section 1. Please notify the experimenter by raising your hand to receive a calculator.
After having received a calculator, click on “Continue” to begin with Section 2.

Screens 27-40: Questions Section 2 (with calculator)
Question texts are specified in Appendix C.
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Screen 41: Questionnaire
You have now completed Section 2. Please click on “Continue” to begin the concluding questionnaire.

Screens 42: Questionnaire
Now we want to learn more about you. Your answers will help us to draw more meaningful conclusions from the
answers that you gave in Sections 1 and 2. It is very important for us that you take your time to truthfully answer
all questions. Your answers will be treated strictly confidential and will be used for research purposes only. Please
click on “Continue”.

Screen 43-54: Questionnaire
Questions on...
- Age, gender, nationality, major, personal financial situation
- Financial literacy core items (Lusardi and Mitchell 2017)
- Numeracy test (Weller et al. 2013)
- Cognitive reflection test (Frederick 2005)
- Rational-experiential inventory 10 item test (Norris et al. 1998)
- Understandability of experimental instructions
Possibility to provide comments and feedback (free text).
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Appendix C: Question texts.
Block 1: Tier 1 and Tier 2, forward-looking:
Tier 1: Today, you invest 10,000 Euro in a stock mutual fund that is expected to return a constant annual return
of 10% for the next 32 years. Assume no additional deposits of withdrawals. Growth is compounded annually and
reinvested into the account. Based on the above information, estimate the value of this stock mutual fund after 32
years.
Tier 2: Alternatively, a bond mutual fund grows at a constant annual return of 5% over the same 32-year period
of time. Growth is compounded annually and reinvested into the account. Assume that you invest in only the stock
fund over this 32-year period, estimate how much more money (in absolute terms) you would have in your account
compared to investing exclusively in the bond fund.

Block 2: Tier 1 and Tier 2, backward-looking:
Tier 1: Your goal is to have 100,000 Euro saved 30 years from today. Today, you invest in a stock mutual fund
that is expected to return a constant annual return of 10% for the next 30 years, before expenses. Assume no
additional deposits or withdrawals. Interest is compounded annually and reinvested into the account. How much
do you need to invest today in order to reach your savings goal in 30 years?
Tier 2: Alternatively, a bond mutual fund grows at a constant annual return of 5% over this same 30-year period
of time. Growth is compounded annually and reinvested into the account. Assume that you invest in only the stock
fund over this 30-year period, estimate how much less money you would need to invest today in order to reach
your savings goal in 30 years compared to investing exclusively in the bond fund.

Block 3: Tier 1 and Tier 3, forward-looking:
Tier 1: Today, you invest 10,000 Euro in a mutual fund that is expected to return a constant annual interest rate of
10% for the next 36 years. Assume no additional deposits of withdrawals. Interest is compounded annually and
reinvested into the account. Based on the above information, estimate the final portfolio value after 36 years.
Tier 3: Now, assume that this mutual fund charges a 2% management fee per year (this fee is applied to the total
value of the portfolio at the end of each year). Based on all of the above information, estimate the final portfolio
value after 36 years.

Block 4: Tier 1 and Tier 3, backward-looking:
Tier 1: Your goal is to have 100,000 Euro saved 35 years from today. Today, you invest in a mutual fund that is
expected to return a constant annual interest rate of 10% for the next 35 years, before expenses. Assume no
additional deposits or withdrawals. Interest is compounded annually and reinvested into the account. How much
do you need to invest today in order to reach your savings goal in 35 years?
Tier 3: Now, assume that this mutual fund charges a 2% management fee per year (this fee is applied to the total
value of the portfolio at the end of each year). Based on all of the above information, how much do you need to
invest today in order to reach your savings goal in 35 years?
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Block 5: Tier 1 and Tier 3, forward-looking:
Tier 1: Assume that 1 apple cost 1 Euro today. Due to inflation, prices of apples will rise by 4% per year over the
next 36 years. What will be the price of 1 apple in 36 years?
Tier 3: Assume that you can invest the 1,000 Euro in a savings account that will yield a constant return of 8% over
the next 36 years. How many apples will you be able to buy in 36 years with the money that you invested into the
account?

Block 6: Tier 1 and Tier 3, backward-looking:
Tier 1: Assume that 1 apple cost 1 Euro today. Due to inflation, prices of apples rose by 3% per year over the next
36 years. What was the price of 1 apple 36 years ago?
Tier 3: Assume that you have 1,000 Euro in your savings account today. Money in the savings account grew by
6% per year over the past 36 years. You did not make any deposits in or withdrawals out of that savings account
during the past 36 years. How many apples were you able to buy with the money that was in that savings account
36 years ago?

Block 7: Tier 4, forward-looking:
Tier 4: Today, you decide to contribute 1,000 Euro per year in an account that earns a constant annual rate of 9%.
Assume no additional deposits or withdrawals. Interest is compounded annually and reinvested into the account.
Based on the above information, estimate your total account balance after 36 years.

Block 8: Tier 4, backward-looking:
Tier 4: Today, you decide to contribute money each year in an account that earns a constant annual rate of 9%.
Assume no additional deposits of withdrawals. Interest is compounded annually and reinvested into the account.
If your goal is to have 1,000,000 Euro in your account in 32 years, how much do you need to contribute each year
into this account, assuming that you contribute the same amount each year?
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Appendix D: CDFs of 𝐸𝑃 in Stages 1 (no calculator) and 2 (with calculator).

Figure D.1: The fugure shows cumulative distributions of 𝐸𝑃 in Stage 1 (without calculator). The distribution is
winsorized between -1.5 and 1.5 in this figure.
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Figure D.2: The fugure shows cumulative distributions of 𝐸𝑃 in Stage 2 (with calculator). The distribution is
winsorized between -1.5 and 1.5 in this figure.
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Appendix E: Descriptive statistics of key variables.
Table E.1: 𝐴𝐸𝑃, proper answers, and confidence levels in Stages 1 (no calculator) and 2 (with calculator).
Panel B: Fraction proper answer Panel C: Average confidence
Panel A: Median 𝐴𝐸𝑃
Tier
N
Stage 1 Stage 2
Diff.
Stage 1
Stage 2
Diff.
Stage 1 Stage 2
Diff.
All
1,064
76.15%
0.00% -76.15%
7.90% 74.53% 66.63%
37.26% 81.17% 43.91%
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
1
456
73.95%
0.00% -73.95%
10.96% 89.47% 78.51%
41.77% 88.63% 46.86%
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
2
152
71.28%
0.00% -71.28%
5.26% 86.84% 81.58%
32.09% 83.39% 51.30%
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
3
304
73.03%
0.10% -72.93%
7.57% 78.29% 70.72%
33.58% 79.86% 46.28%
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
4
152
94.12% 91.35% -2.77%
1.97%
9.87%
7.90%
36.24% 59.19% 22.95%
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Median AEP, fraction of proper answers, and average confidence, by Tiers. An answer is considered “proper” if 𝐴𝐸𝑃
< 10% (Stage 1) or 𝐴𝐸𝑃𝑐 < 10% (Stage 2) respectively. Two-sided p-values are provided in parentheses and are based
on Wilcoxon signed rank-tests, McNemar-tests, and paired Student t-tests respectively.

